We propose a model in which investors cannot costlessly process information from asset prices. At the trading stage, investors are boundedly rational and their interpretation of prices injects noise into the price system, which serves as a source of endogenous noise trading. Compared to the standard rational expectations equilibrium, our setup features price momentum and yields higher return volatility and excessive trading volume. In an overall equilibrium, investors optimally choose their sophistication levels by balancing the bene…t of beating the market against the cost of acquiring sophistication.
Introduction
Data can be viewed as information only after it has been analyzed. Interpreting data is often costly in terms of time, e¤ort, and other resources. This is particular true for market data given the complexity of modern …nancial markets. In the existing frameworks-such as the traditional (noisy) rational expectations equilibrium (REE) model (e.g., Radner, 1979; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Hellwig, 1980) , and the more recent REE-disagreement hybrid models (e.g., Banerjee, 2011)-investors perfectly comprehend the price function and thus can costlessly read into the price to uncover value-relevant information. Apparently, such an argument requires a high degree of sophistication on the part of market participants. 1 What if interpreting price information is costly and investors commit errors in the inference process? How to determine the sophistication levels of investors in interpreting prices? How does investor sophistication a¤ect market prices, trading volume, and investor welfare? In this paper, we propose a structural model to address these questions. We show that the errors committed by traders in making inferences from prices inject endogenous noise into the price system and provide a behavioral foundation for noise trading.
In our model, a continuum of investors interact with each other in two periods. In the second period, investors trade on private information in a …nancial market. As in the standard REE, the asset price aggregates information and investors make inference from the price. However, at the trading stage, investors are boundedly rational and do not fully understand the price function. We discipline their beliefs using a "receiver noise" approach as in Myatt and Wallace (2012) . A fully sophisticated investor would extract the best signal possible from the price (which is endogenously determined in equilibrium), while a less sophisticated investor introduces noise in interpreting the price. After investors form their beliefs based on the personalized price signals, they behave as rational Bayesian and make optimal investments in response to their own beliefs. Through market clearing, investors' optimal asset investments in turn endogenously determine the equilibrium price function and 1 As discussed by Guesnerie (1992) , this comprehension is broadly justi…ed in two ways: the "eductive" justi…cation that relies on the understanding of the logic of the situation faced by economic agents and that is associated with mental activity of agents aiming at "forecasting the forecasts of others;"and the "evolutive" justi…cation that emphasizes the learning possibilities o¤ered by the repetition of the situation and that is associated with the convergence of several versions of learning processes. See Section 7.1 in Vives (2008) . hence the best price signal (i.e., the "truth"in investors'personalized price signals).
In the …rst period, investors optimally choose their sophistication levels to maximize ex ante expected utilities. On the one hand, increasing sophistication reduces the bounded rationality at the later trading stage, which therefore bene…ts investors ex ante. On the other hand, acquiring sophistication is costly. For instance, if we think of investors as individual investors, then in order to become more sophisticated, investors may need better education/training (which will cost wealth) or simply need to think harder (which will be involved with mental costs). The optimal sophistication level is determined by balancing the bene…t from reduced bounded rationality against the cost of sophistication acquisition.
Investors in our setting can also be interpreted as …nancial institutions such as hedge funds or mutual funds. Each institution has both a trading desk and a research department.
The trading desk is responsible for trading assets but it relies on the institution's research department to generate information from prices. Even if the research department is able to extract the correct signal from prices in the form of research reports, when it passes the signal to the trading desk, the trading desk may add noise in comprehending the reports (which leads to the receiver-noise approach in forming traders'beliefs). The research department can train the trading desk to improve the understanding of the research reports, which corresponds to a higher sophistication level of investors at the trading stage in our model.
We …rst analyze the equilibrium in the …nancial market, which can be viewed as an REE extended with bounded rationality. We …nd that costly price interpretation can inject noise into the price system. This result relates to De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990, DSSW) who show that the misperception of irrational traders about asset fundamentals can pose "noise trader risk" to rational arbitrageurs. We extend the idea to an asymmetric information setting through imperfect price interpretation. Speci…cally, in our setting, the equilibrium price is a linear function of the asset fundamental and a noise term. The fundamental element comes from aggregating investors' private value-relevant information, which is the root reason why investors care to learn from the price. The noise term in the price arises from a common error in investors'personalized price signals, which is meant to capture the idea that in processing price data, investors may su¤er a common cognitive error (such as "sentiment"/"misperception") or technical error (such as a pricing error in commonly used factor models). When investors become more sophisticated, they understand better the true price signal and their trading brings less noise into the price. As investor sophistication approaches to in…nity, the asset price approaches the standard REE.
Compared to the standard REE (in which investors are in…nitely sophisticated), costly interpretation of prices leads to price momentum (future returns depend positively on the current price), excessive return volatility, and excessive trading volume. This result is consistent with the existing empirical evidence (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) on momentum; Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) on excess volatility; and Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) on excessive trading). In addition, this result also demonstrates that our setup qualitatively di¤ers from the traditional models with exogenous noise trading such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) . For instance, in Hellwig (1980) , asset returns exhibit reversals-a high price predicts a future price decline-which is opposite of our prediction (see also Section 4.2.1 in Vives, 2008) .
As investors become gradually more sophisticated, return volatility generally decreases, while both disagreement and trading volume can exhibit a hump shape. This …nding echoes Gar…nkel (2009) who …nds that volume is a better proxy for disagreement than return volatility. It also helps to reconcile the contradictory evidence on the relation between disagreement and return volatility. For instance, Frankel and Foot (1990) After analyzing the …nancial market equilibrium, we turn to examine how sophistication levels are determined in an overall equilibrium. From an individual's perspective, the incentive to acquire sophistication comes primarily from beating the average sophistication level across the market, which allows the investor to interpret the price better and trade better (i.e., more likely to buy low and sell high). However, this race in sophistication forms a fallacy of composition, because all investors end up with the same equilibrium sophistication level and no one can gain from beating the market in equilibrium.
Acquiring sophistication by all investors a¤ects equilibrium welfare both directly and indirectly. The direct e¤ect works through incurring sophistication-acquisition cost. The indirect e¤ect works through a¤ecting a welfare loss driven by speculative trading. Speci…cally, in our setting, investors do not trade to share risks and thus, their equilibrium positions only re ‡ect the noise terms in their private information, which is a form of "winner's curse" as pointed out by Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2010) . This winner's curse harms investor welfare; it manifests itself as a product of trading size and return volatility, both of which can be a¤ected by sophistication acquisition. In particular, since more sophisticated investors understand the price better, their trading brings more information than noise into the price. As a result, the price is closer to the asset fundamental, which helps to protect investors. Nonetheless, due to the interactions among various forces, the overall welfare e¤ect of sophistication acquisition is generally ambiguous.
We also …nd strategic complementarity in sophistication acquisition, which leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Speci…cally, when a representative investor decides to become more sophisticated in reading the price, price informativeness increases and the price conveys more information, which increases the marginal value of attending to price data at the trading stage. This in turn further strengthens investors'ex-ante incentives to acquire sophistication. This strategic complementarity implies that multiple sophistication levels can be sustained in equilibrium. Thus, when an exogenous parameter, for instance, the cost of achieving sophistication, changes, there can be jumps in equilibrium sophistication levels. This can correspond to waves of development of algorithmic trading in reality in response to exogenous shocks to the economy, say, some regulation changes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 presents the model and the equilibrium concept. Section 4 studies the equilibrium in the …nancial market for given sophistication levels of investors. Section 5 determines the overall equilibrium including the investor's sophistication level and examines investor welfare and potential multiplicity. Section 6 performs a robustness exercise in a two-type economy. Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs are gathered in an appendix.
Related Literature

Literature on Ignoring Information
There is a recent literature on environment complexity that makes agents fail to account for the informational content of other players'actions in game settings. Eyster and Rabin (2005) develop the concept of "cursed equilibrium,"which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players'actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with other players'information. Esponda (2008) extends Eyster and Rabin's (2005) concept to "behavioral equilibrium"by endogenizing the beliefs of cursed players. Esponda and Pouzo (2016) propose the concept of "Berk-Nash equilibrium" to capture that people can have a possibly misspeci…ed view of their environment. Although these models are cast in a game theoretical framework, the spirit of our …nancial market model is similar. In our model, investors'interactions are mediated by an asset price, which can be viewed a summary statistic for all the other players'actions.
Eyster, Rabin, and Vayanos (2015) have applied the cursed equilibrium concept to a …nancial market setting and labeled the resulting equilibrium as the cursed expectations equilibrium (CEE). In a CEE, an investor is a combination of a fully rational REE investor (who correctly reads information from the price) and a naive Walrasian investor (who totally neglects the information in the asset price). Our investors at the trading stage are conceptually related to but di¤erent from a partially cursed investor. Peng and Xiong (2006) have considered a representative agent framework in which the attention-constrained agent is not allowed to learn information prices. In their supplementary material, both Mondria (2010) and Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016) have analyzed REE settings in which investors ignore the information from prices.
In particular, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016) show that if it requires capacity for investors to process information from prices, then investors would choose not to process that information and to obtain independent signals instead. In our setting, investors optimally determine the sophistication level which in turn determines how much information they will extract from the price. Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2009) and Banerjee (2011) have combined REE and dis-agreement frameworks to allow investors underestimate the precision of other investors'private information (and hence also labeled as "dismissiveness"models). A dismissive investor can be roughly viewed as a combination of a fully sophisticated and a naive agent, and thus conceptually related to our investors at the trading stage. However, in the dismissiveness model, investors can still read perfectly from the price function and they only disagree about the distribution of other investors'signals.
Literature on Correlated Errors in Beliefs
As stated, we model investor sophistication by the degree of individual noise added to the best signal possible extracted from the price following a similar approach to Myatt and Wallace (2002) . We extend Myatt and Wallace (2002) by introducing a common term into receiver's noise, which in turn endogenously determines the accuracy of the best price signal (see Section 3.1 for a fuller discussion).
The common term in receiver's noise can also be understood as a form of "sentiment"or "misperception,"which therefore connects our paper to the behavioral economics literature (see Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for excellent surveys). In particular, the way we model investors'beliefs shares similarity with DSSW (1990). In DSSW(1990), irrational noise traders misperceive future asset payo¤s, and because this misperception is identical across all noise traders, it generates noise trader risk to rational arbitrageurs in …nancial markets. In our setting, investors su¤er misperception when they try to read information from the price and the misperception generates endogenous noise trading that in turn determines the accuracy of price information. In a way, our analysis can be viewed as DSSW cast in an asymmetric information model with endogenous sophistication. Recently, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2016) propose a model to show market e¢ ciency is closely connected to the e¢ ciency of asset management. In our model, market e¢ ciency is determined by how investors (institutions or retail investors) interpret the asset price. Mertens (2011, 2017) have proposed a "near-rational" approach to endogenize noise trading in REE settings. A near-rational agent has wrong perceptions of the …rst-order moment but has the correct perception of all higher moments. In particular, a near-rational agent's expectation about a random variable is the rational expectation swayed by a common error ("sentiment") and an agent-speci…c error. In our setting, we do not model perceived moments directly, but instead, we model investors' beliefs based on signals. As a result, when our investors predict fundamentals, both their perceived expectations and variances will di¤er from those of a fully rational investor. In addition, unlike Mertens (2011, 2017) who specify misperception about the exogenous asset fundamental or productivity, we instead specify misperception about the asset price, which itself is an endogenous variable whose statistical properties are in turn a¤ected by investors'misperception. This di¤erence generates some novel theory insight such as strategic complementarity in sophistication acquisition.
A Model of Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices
Setup
Environment We consider an economy with three dates, t = 0; 1; and 2. At t = 1, two assets are traded in a competitive market: a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The risk-free asset has a constant value of 1 and is in unlimited supply. The risky asset is traded at an endogenous pricep and is in zero supply. It pays an uncertain cash ‡ow at date 2, denoted V . We assume thatṼ has two elements, a learnable elementṽ and an unlearnable element , which are mutually independent and normally distributed. That is,
There is a continuum [0; 1] of investors who derive expected utility from their date-2 wealth. They have constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of > 0. As we mentioned in the introduction, investors can represent either retail investors or …nancial institutions. Investors have fundamental information and trade on it. Speci…cally, at the beginning of date 1, prior to trading, investor i is endowed with the following private signal about the learnable elementṽ in the asset payo¤:
where " > 0, and (ṽ;~ ; f" i g i ) are mutually independent. We will refer to both the learnable elementṽ and the total asset payo¤Ṽ as "fundamentals."The unlearnable element~ re ‡ects the notion that investors collectively do not know the true payo¤ from the risky asset.
Each investor has two selves, self 0 and self 1, who make decisions at dates 0 and 1, respectively. The two selves behave in the sense of Kahneman's (2011) two thinking systems. Self 1 engages in fast but noisy thinking; she makes trading decisions in the date-1 …nancial market and is boundedly rational in interpreting the information content of prices, adding noise in the process. Self 0 engages in slow and deliberative thinking; she is fully rational, extracts the best signal about fundamentals from prices, and determines the future self's sophistication level. Alternatively, we can interpret the two selves of our investors as the research department (self 0) and trading desk (self 1) of an investment institution. The trading desk is responsible for trading assets and it relies on the institution's research department to generate information from the prices. Research departments are able to extract the best signal from the price in the form of research reports, but when they pass the signal to trading desks, trading desks add noise in comprehending the reports.
Self 1' s belief speci…cation One key feature of REE is that investors look into the asset price to make inference about fundamentals, which is usually modeled as a statistical signal, s p , about the asset fundamentalṼ . In standard REE models, investors are sophisticated enough to understand the statistical properties of the price function that links the pricep to the fundamentalṼ and thus, they can convert the pricep into a best signals p to extract information aboutṼ . In practice, it is questionable that the information in asset prices in modern …nancial markets can be fully understood by market participants. A better understanding of the market structure needs more e¤ort. Even worse, the very act of extracting information from the price can bring noise into the price, as interpreting prices can involve errors.
In out setting, we maintain REE's key element that investors make inference from prices but relax the restriction that investors can do so costlessly. To capture this idea, we endow self 1 (trading desk) of each investor (the self who makes trading decisions in the …nancial market) with a reduced-form belief speci…cation which adds noise to the best signal that can be derived from pricess p that is understood by self 0 (research department). Speci…cally, self 1 of investor i interprets the information in the pricep with additional noise:
Here,s p is the best signal implied by the price, which is also the best signal that a fully sophisticated investor can obtain in a standard REE setting (self 0 or research department).
Variablex i is the noise in processing the price data, which can come from fast mental reasoning or from technology capacity. We do not model where speci…cation (1) comes from and thus it is a reduced-form belief formation. The standard REE concept corresponds to a situation in which investors can costlessly process the price inference problem, so that the noisex i degenerates to 0.
We further specify that noise termx i in (1) admits a factor structure:
where (ũ; fẽ i g i ) is mutually independent and independent of all other random variables. 2 Note that, by equations (1) and (2), we have 1 x = 1 u + 1 e . In (2), the idiosyncratic noisẽ e i is speci…c to investor i. The common noiseũ in investors' price signals may represent waves of optimism and pessimism, which corresponds to the notion of "sentiment" in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., DSSW, 1990; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Angeletos and La'o, 2013; Benhabib, Wang, and Wen, 2015). For instance, DSSW (1990) assume that all noise traders misperceive future asset payo¤ with a common error that generates noise trader risk to rational arbitrageurs. The termũ in our setting can also arise from a common error in data-processing algorithms. 3 As we will show shortly, the random variableũ will enter the price endogenously as noise trading in the noisy REE literature (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980) . In addition, we will show that even very small noisesũ andẽ i in investors'personalized beliefs can have signi…cant e¤ect on market outcomes. Sophistication (attention) Investors can study market data more intensively to reduce their noisex i in (1), thereby bringing the price signals p;i closer to the best signals p . The reduction in noise depends on their sophistication levels. We follow Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and model this noise-reduction process as investors gleaning private information about x i . Speci…cally, self 1 of investor i can study the market and obtain the following signal about
where~ i is independent of all other random variables and independent of each other. Conditional onz i , the noise in investor i's price signals p;i has a posterior distributioñ
which indeed has a variance x + i 1 smaller than the prior variance 1 x (i.e., self 1's bounded rationality is reduced from 1
x to x + i 1 ).
Precision i controls investor i's ability or "sophistication" level in interpreting asset prices. When i = 1, self 1 of investor i is fully rational and she can interpret the asset price costlessly, which reduces our economy to the traditional REE setting. We assume that improving sophistication i is costly, which is re ‡ected by a weakly increasing and convex cost function of precision, C i (similar to the literature, e.g., Verrecchia, 1982;  Vives, 2008; Myatt and Wallace, 2012). Although the cost is denoted in wealth terms, it can measure both monetary cost (such as expenses of attending educational programs) and
mental cost (such as thinking harder to be more attentive).
Alternatively, we can interpret sophistication parameter i as attention: if investors do not pay attention then there is limited learning from the price, but to pay attention is costly.
For instance, in the language of Pavan (2014), parameter i can be thought of as the time investor i devotes to the information source (which is the price in our context) and C i denotes the attention cost incurred by the investor. 4 For our analysis, it does not matter i , which captures how much information is transmitted after the investor processes price data. The investor incurs a cost C (K) to process price information more accurately. The recent experimental study by Dean and Neligh (2017) …nds supporting which interpretation (sophistication or attention) makes more sense. We use the two words sophistication and attention interchangeably, although the language we use in the rest of the paper follows mostly the …rst interpretation of sophistication.
The optimal sophistication decision on i is made by self 0 at date 0. Self 0 of each investor is fully rational in choosing the sophistication level of her future self. This treatment is in the same spirit of "optimal expectations" studied by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnermeier, Papakonstantinou, and Parker (2016). In the optimal-expectations literature, forward-looking agents derive positive anticipatory utility from optimistic beliefs but su¤er disutility from distorted decision making. The optimal beliefs are chosen to balance this bene…t-cost trade-o¤ to maximize average felicity, which is evaluated under the objective probability. In our setting, sophistication i governs self 1's beliefs via equations (3) and (4) and thus, by choosing i , self 0 is e¤ectively disciplining her future self's biased belief. Self 0 optimally balances this discipline bene…t against the mental costs of acquiring sophistication to determine the sophistication level i .
As pointed out by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Kahneman (2011), the division of rational self 0 and bounded rational self 1 is consistent with the view that some human behaviors are determined primarily by the slower, conscious processing of the prefrontal cortex (self 0), while others are determined by rapid and unconscious processing of the limbic system (self 1). It is possible that agents are unaware of this division and the decision of self 0 is made subconsciously. From a modeler's perspective, the determination of sophistication i can be viewed as if self 0 trades o¤ a better reading of prices in the later market against a mental cost C i of acquiring sophistication. In this "as if"argument, the fully rational self 0 anticipates that her future self will become boundedly rational in reading information from asset prices, and thus today, she has an incentive to reduce the later bounded rationality at a commitment cost C i . Our speci…cation of belief and sophistication matches closely the attention structure in Myatt and Wallace (2012) . In our institutional interpretation it is as if the research department sends the signals p to the trading desk which adds receiver noise. Indeed, the termx i in (1) corresponds to the notion of "receiver noise" in Myatt and Wallace (2012) evidence for rational inattention but not for the cost function based on mutual information. and extends it in three important ways. First, in equation (2), we allow both a common noiseũ and an agent-speci…c noiseẽ i in investor i's receiver noise, where Myatt and Wallace (2012) only deal with agent-speci…c receiver noise. Second, the quality or accuracy of the correct underlying signals p is endogenous, while it is exogenous in Myatt and Wallace (2012).
Third, Myatt and Wallace (2012) assume that paying attention i can linearly increase the precision of receiver noise. Here, we employ a learning structure to endogenously generate a posterior receiver-noise precision that is linear in i , as shown by equation (4).
Timeline and Equilibrium Concept
The timeline of our economy is as follows: t = 0 : Self 0 of each investor (research department) chooses i to maximize ex ante utility. Self 0 is fully rational and so she computes the expected utility under the correct belief. t = 1 : Self 1 of each investor (trading desk) receives the private fundamental signals i , acquires the signalz i according to i speci…ed by self 0, and submits demand schedules.
Self 1 is boundedly rational in reading information from the prices, and thus she interprets the price as a signals p;i in making inferences. This implies that the demand schedule is D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ). Market clears at pricep. t = 2 : Asset payo¤Ṽ is realized, and investors get paid and consume.
The overall equilibrium in our model is composed of a date-1 trading equilibrium in …nancial market and a date-0 sophistication determination equilibrium. In the date-1 …nancial market equilibrium, self 1 of each investor maximizes her conditional subjective expected utility and the asset market clears for given sophistication levels i . This equilibrium determines the price function and hence the best price signals p . In the sophistication determination stage, self 0 of each investor optimally chooses the sophistication level i to maximize her ex-ante expected utility taking into account future equilibrium demands. Alternatively, in the institutional interpretation, the research department of the entity chooses a level of training of the trading desk. In Section 4, we will consider …rst a …nancial market equilibrium taking investors'sophistication level i as given. In Section 5 we will deal with the overall equilibrium and the determination of sophistication levels.
Financial Market Equilibrium
At date 1, self 1 of each investor chooses investments in assets to maximize her subjective expected utility. Investors are price takers but still actively infer information from the pricẽ p, although adding individual noise in their inference process. Formally, investor i chooses investment D i in the risky asset to maximize
with her …nal wealthW i given bỹ
where we have normalized her initial wealth level at 0 and take i as given.
The operator E i [ jp;s i ;z i ] in (5) indicates that self 1 of investor i takes expectation with respect to her own (subjective) belief. Speci…cally, investor i observes fp;s i ;z i g and needs to forecast her future wealthW i . Sincep is in her information set, she takesp as a known constant. Thus, in equation (6), the only random variable she faces is the fundamentalṼ .
When she predictsṼ , she extracts information from the price by interpretingp as a signal s p;i according to (1) . Endowed with signals fs i ;s p;i ;z i g, self 1 of investor i is a subjective expected utility investor, and in particular, she is Bayesian. As a consequence, in investor i's mind at date 1, the fundamentalṼ follows a normal distribution conditional on fs i ;s p;i ;z i g.
The CARA-normal setting implies that investor i's demand for the risky asset is
where E(Ṽ js i ;s p;i ;z i ) and V ar(Ṽ js i ;s p;i ;z i ) are the conditional expectation and variance of V given information fs i ;s p;i ;z i g. In (7), we have explicitly incorporateds p;i in the demand function to re ‡ect the informational role of the price (i.e., the price helps to predictṼ ) and usedp per se to capture the substitution role of the price (i.e., a higher price directly leads to a lower demand). Thus, the conditioning on the price in (7) is only used to gauge scarcity as with any other good but the learning on fundamentals is via the private signals p;i or "price interpretation."
The …nancial market clears, i.e.,
This market-clearing condition, together with demand function (7), will determine an equilibrium price function,p = p(ṽ;ũ): (9) whereṽ andũ come from the aggregation of signalss i ,s p;i , andz i . In equilibrium, price function (9) will endogenously determine the informational content in the best signals p .
A …nancial market equilibrium for given sophistication levels ( i ) i2[0;1] is characterized by a price function p(ṽ;ũ) and demand functions D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ), such that:
1. D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ) is given by (7), which maximizes investors'conditional subjective expected utilities given their beliefs at date 1;
2. The market clears almost surely, i.e., equation (8) holds; 3. Investors'date-1 beliefs are given by (1), (2), and (3), wheres p in (1) is implied by the equilibrium price function p(ṽ;ũ).
Equilibrium Construction
We consider a linear …nancial market equilibrium in which the price function takes the following form:p = a vṽ + a uũ ;
where the coe¢ cients a's are endogenous.
By equation (10), provided that a v 6 = 0 (which is true in equilibrium), the pricep is equivalent to the following signal in predicting the asset fundamentalṽ:
which would be the best signal that a fully sophisticated investor can achieve. However, as we mentioned in Section 3.1, at date 1, investor i can not costlessly process the price information, and she can only read a coarser signal as follows:
where the second equality follows from equations (1) and (2). In other words, in the inference process, our investors add noise to the best signal that a fully sophisticated investor could obtain.
Recall that after acquiring sophistication i at date 0, investor i at date 1 can study market data to further purge the receiver noisex i in her personalized price signals p;i . This is represented by an access to the private signalz i in (3). By Bayes'rule, the two signals fs p;i ;z i g combine to generate the following signals pz;i in predicting the fundamentalṽ:
The signals pz;i summarizes the overall information that investor i can extract from the price after seeingz i . It predictsṽ with a precision given by
Using Bayes'rule, we can compute
where the coe¢ cients 's are given in the appendix. Inserting these two expressions into (7) , we can compute the expression of D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ), which is in turn inserted into (8) to compute the equilibrium price as a function ofṽ andũ. Comparing coe¢ cients with the conjectured price function (10), we can form a system of equations to determine the two unknown price coe¢ cients a v and a u . ( e " + " ) 3 + 2 e " 2 + ( e " + e + u " ) e u = 0: (16) Note that in Proposition 1, we have a u > 0 for any 2 (0; 1). That is, costly interpretation of asset prices brings an endogenous noiseũ into the price system. As ! 1, investors become fully sophisticated and thus they can extract the best signal from the price. In this limiting case, the noiseũ will vanish in the price function, which degenerates our economy to the full REE setup. It is worth noting that the full REE with = 1 is not implementable in demand functions. 
Implications of Investor Sophistication
In this subsection, we examine how investor sophistication a¤ects asset prices, investor beliefs, and trading volume. We assume that all investors have a common sophistication level and conduct comparative static analysis with respect to . In a full equilibrium setting, an increase in corresponds to a decrease in some parameter that governs the cost function C ( ), which will be explored later in Section 5.
Price Informativeness and Asset Returns
Price informativeness As standard in the literature (e.g., Vives, 2008; Peress, 2010), we can use the precision 1 V ar(Ṽ jp) of stock payo¤ conditional on its price to measure "price informativeness"(or "market e¢ ciency,""informational e¢ ciency,"and "price e¢ ciency"). 5 By equation (10), applying Bayes'rule delivers
Since v , u , and are exogenous constants, we can measure price informativeness inversely by : a high value of corresponds to a low value of price informativeness. 5 In our setting, we can also measure price informativeness from an investor's date-1 perspective, which is the precision 1 V ar(Ṽ jspz;i) of stock payo¤ conditional on personalized price signalss pz;i . Nonetheless, the two price-informativeness measures 1 V ar(Ṽ jp) and 1 V ar(Ṽ jspz;i) do not di¤er much, when the precision u and e of the errors in investors'personalized signals are small (which is the focus of our analysis).
We can show that price informativeness increases with investor sophistication (i.e., decreases with ). Intuitively, when investors pay a lot of attention to study price data, they know well the true price signals p , and thus their trading brings less noiseũ into the price.
This complementarity result has important implications for determining the sophistication level in Section 5.
In the left two panels of Figure 1 , we use solid curves to plot price informativeness against investor sophistication . As a comparison, the dashed lines plot the -value in the standard REE economy (i.e., = 0 for = 1). We have set the other values at " 2 f0:001; 1g, v = = = 1, and e = u = 1000. We deliberately set very large precision of common noiseũ and idiosyncratic noiseẽ i in investors'price signals p;i in equation (1), so that investors make very small errors in forming their date-1 beliefs. We …nd that, however, these small errors can aggregate into a signi…cant e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes. In both panels, we observe (a) that costly interpretation of prices injects noise into the price as long as investors are not fully sophisticated (i.e., the solid curves lie above the dashed lines); and (b) that price informativeness increases with sophistication (i.e., the solid curves are downward sloping).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Return volatility Buying the asset at the date-1 market costsp per share. Holding it till date 2 generates a payo¤Ṽ . Hence, the asset return per share isṼ p. Return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of asset returns, (Ṽ p).
In the middle two panels of Figure 1 , we plot return volatility (Ṽ p) against investor sophistication with solid curves. Again, the dashed lines correspond to the value in the standard REE economy. We make the following two observations. First, costly interpretation of prices generates higher return volatility than the full REE benchmark (i.e., the solid curves lie above the dashed lines in both panels). This may help to address the volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981) , which states that it is di¢ cult to explain the historical volatility of stock returns with any model in which investors are rational and discount rates are constant. Also note that the excess return volatility is non-negligible even though investors only make very small mistakes with u v = e v = 1000. For instance, in the top panel with " = 0:001, costly interpretation of prices can lead to more than 30% of excess return volatility.
Second, return volatility decreases with investor sophistication (i.e., the solid curves are downward sloping). This is because price informativeness increases with , which implies that sophistication makes the pricep closer to the fundamentalṼ , driving down the equilibrium return volatility. As explored in Section 5, this return-volatility result has implications for investor welfare.
Return predictability We now examine whether and how asset returnsṼ The price momentum in our model is an underreaction story. When investors are fully sophisticated ( = 1), the price fully aggregates their private information and there is no return predictability. Formally, by Corollary 1, the price is a martingale (p REE = E(Ṽ jp REE )) and hence the price change is not predictable (Cov(Ṽ p REE ;p REE ) = 0). When investors have limited sophistication, their forecasts do not fully use the information in the price, which in turn causes their trading not to fully incorporate information, thereby making the price underreact to information.
In the right two panels of Figure 1 , we plot m against in solid curves, where the dashed lines still indicate the m-values in a standard REE model. In both panels, we observe that m is indeed positive, indicating that there exists price momentum in our economy. In addition, m can be hump-shaped or decreasing in , depending on the value of the precision " of private information. It is intuitive that m decreases with for large values of , since m eventually degenerates to 0 as approaches to in…nity. Figure 1 demonstrates that m can also increase with for small values of , which is true when investors have coarse private information (i.e., " is small). The intuition is as follows. When both " and are small, investors have little private information and read little information from the price. In equilibrium, the price is close to being a constant since it does not aggregate much information. This means that the price does not have much predictive power for future returns. Now if we increase , investors start to pay more attention to the price, and thus their trading starts to inject more information into the price, generating more predictability of asset returns.
Proposition 2 (Price informativeness, return volatility, and price momentum)
(a) Price informativeness
As investors at date 1 become more sophisticated, the pricep conveys more precise information about the asset fundamentalṼ . That is, @ @ < 0.
(b) Return volatility
(1) As ! 1, return volatility approaches 1=2 (i.e., lim !1 (Ṽ p) = 1=2 ).
(2) As investor sophistication level increases, return volatility monotonically decreases if investors'fundamental information is su¢ ciently coarse or su¢ ciently precise (i.e., @ (Ṽ p) @ < 0 if " is su¢ ciently small or su¢ ciently large). 
where E(Ṽ )
is the average expectation across investors at date 1.
In the two middle panels of Figure 2 , we plot Disagreement against investor sophistication in solid curves. The other parameters take the same values as in Figure 1 . The dashed lines still plot the values in the standard REE economy with = 1. By Corollary 1, when = 1, the price perfectly reveals the aggregate fundamental information, and so investors agree on asset valuation. As a result, Disagreement = 0 for = 1. Comparing the solid curves to dashed lines, we see that costly interpretation of prices adds disagreement among investors.
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Disagreement can change with non-monotonically, depending on the precision " of investors'private fundamental information. This is due to two opposite forces. First, investors interpret the price in di¤erent ways, and so a higher means that investors'expectations rely more on their diverse information extracted from the price, thereby leading to a larger belief heterogeneity. Second, a higher implies that the price conveys more precise information about the asset fundamental (see Part (a) of Proposition 2), which tends to make investors' date-1 belief converge. In addition, since disagreement vanishes when = 1, it must be the case that the negative e¤ect dominates for su¢ ciently large , so that Disagreement decreases with when is large. Nonetheless, when is small, the …rst positive e¤ect can dominate as well. This possibility will arise when investors'private fundamental information is very coarse (i.e., " is small). Intuitively, starting from a small " , before accessing to market data, investors'date-1 beliefs are close to the prior and thus do not di¤er much from each other; after they see the price and interpret it di¤erently, their opinions start to diverge. Taken together, when " is small, Disagreement is hump-shaped in . When " is large, Disagreement monotonically decreases with .
Trading volume To focus on the volume generated solely by di¤erent price interpretations, we assume that investors start with a zero initial position of risky assets. Therefore, the trading volume of investor i and the total trading volume are, respectively, jD (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i )j = E(Ṽ js i ;s p;i ;z i ) p V ar(Ṽ js i ;s p;i ;z i ) and V olume
When all investors have the same sophistication level , they face the same variance in trading the risky asset, i.e.,
Risk V ar(Ṽ js
where the second equality follows from equation (15) . Hence, by demand function (7) and market-clearing condition (8), the equilibrium price is equal to the average expectation of investors,p
By equations (17)-(21), we can compute
Thus, the total trading volume is jointly determined by three factors: investors' di¤erent date-1 expectations about the asset fundamentalṽ, investors'risk aversion coe¢ cient , and the risk faced by investors in trading the assets. When investors disagree more about the future fundamentalṼ , they trade more and so the total trading volume is higher. When investors are less risk averse and when they perceive less risk in trading the assets, they also trade more aggressively, leading to a higher total trading volume.
Remark 1 (Hedging-motivated trade)
The assumption that investors start with no risky assets does not a¤ect our result. Suppose instead that investor i is initially endowed withỹ i shares of risky asset, whereỹ i N 0; 2 y is independently and identically distributed across investors. Our baseline model corresponds to a degenerate case of y = 0. In this extended setting, we can compute that the total trading volume is given by This expression di¤ers from equation (22) only by a constant q 2 y that captures the volume generated by the endowment heterogeneity.
We continue our numerical example of Figure 2 and plot V olume and Risk against .
We observe that Risk decreases with . This is because more sophisticated investors glean more information from price data for two reasons. First, a higher sophistication level means that they study market data more intensively and can directly get more information from the price. Second, by Part (a) of Proposition 2, when all investors study the price more intensively, the price itself becomes a more informative signal (i.e., decreases), and thus each investor at date 1 can infer more information from the price. As ! 1, the price aggregates perfectly investors'private information and investors'perceived risk declines to V ar(Ṽ jṽ) = 1 .
The volume pattern mimics the disagreement pattern. First, comparing the solid curves to the dashed lines, we see that costly price interpretation generates excess trading volume.
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence documented in the …nance literature is always downward sloping in investor sophistication in Figure 1 , but disagreement can exhibit a hump-shape in Figure 2 . Thus, to the extent that is driving the cross-sectional variation, return volatility and disagreement can move in the same or opposite directions.
Some recent studies suggest possible empirical proxies for investor sophistication or attention i , which therefore facilitates the testing of our model predictions on returns and volume. For instance, Gargano and Rossi (2016) …nd that males pay more attention than females; that attention is an increasing function of investors' age; and that brokerage account holders with higher invested wealth and higher exposure to small capitalization stocks, growth stocks, momentum stocks, and the overall market, are more attentive. These …ndings basically connect i to the observable characteristics of investors or assets.
Proposition 3 (Risk, disagreement, and trading volume)
(a) Risk
As investors become more sophisticated at date 1, investors perceive lower risk in trading (i.e., @Risk @ < 0). As ! 1, risk approaches 1 (i.e., lim !1 Risk = 1 ).
(b) Investor disagreement
(1) As ! 1, investor disagreement vanishes (i.e., lim !1 Disagreement = 0).
(2) When investors have coarse fundamental information, disagreement is hump-shaped in investor sophistication (i.e., for small values of " , @Disagreement @ < 0 if and only if is su¢ ciently large). When investors have precise fundamental information, disagreement decreases monotonically with sophistication (i.e., for large values of " , @Disagreement @ < 0 for all values of ).
(c) Trading volume
(1) As ! 1, the total trading volume vanishes (i.e., lim !1 V olume = 0).
(2) When investors have coarse fundamental information, trading volume is humpshaped in investor sophistication (i.e., for small values of " , @V olume @ < 0 if and only if is su¢ ciently large). When investors have precise fundamental information, trading volume decreases monotonically with sophistication (i.e., for large values of " , @V olume @ < 0 for all values of ).
Sophistication Level Equilibrium
Sophistication Determination
As we discussed in Section 3.1, the sophistication level is determined by the rational self 0 of each investor at date 0. Inserting the date-1 demand function D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ) in (7) into the CARA utility function and taking expectations yield investor i's date-0 payo¤,
i . Note that this expectation is computed under the correct distribution, because self 0 is fully rational in contemplating the sophistication level i of her future self, which in turn determines how much information the boundedly rational self 1 will read from the asset pricep (or, alternatively, the research department knows that that the trading desk will add noise but can control its level investing in training). Formally, i is determined by
De…nition 1 An overall equilibrium of the two-stage game is de…ned as follows:
(a) Financial market equilibrium at date 1, which is characterized by a price function p(ṽ;ũ) and demand functions D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ), such that:
(1) D (p;s i ;s p;i ;z i ) is given by (7) , which maximizes investors' conditional subjective expected utilities given their date-1 beliefs;
(2) the market clears almost surely, i.e., equation (8) holds;
(3) investors'date-1 beliefs are given by (1), (2) , and (3), wheres p in (1) is implied by the equilibrium price function p(ṽ;ũ) and where the sophistication levels ( i ) i2[0 ;1] are determined at date 0.
(b) Sophistication level equilibrium at date 0, which is characterized by sophistication levels ] , such that i solves (23), where investors' date-1 beliefs are given by (1)-(3), withs p in (1) being determined by the price function p(ṽ;ũ) in the date-1 …nancial market equilibrium.
Equilibrium Characterization
Given that investors are ex ante identical, we consider symmetric equilibrium in which all investors choose the same sophistication level. Let W i ; denote the certainty equivalent of investor i's date-0 payo¤ when she decides to acquire a sophistication level i and all the other investors acquire a sophistication level . That is,
where the second equality follows from the properties of normal distributions. The optimal sophistication level i is determined by i = arg max i W i ; .
In equation (24), improving the sophistication of future self 1 a¤ects the current self 0's payo¤ in three ways. The …rst e¤ect is a direct e¤ect: acquiring sophistication incurs a cost, C i , which directly harms the investor from self 0's perspective. The other two e¤ects are indirect, which work through a¤ecting the trading in the future …nancial market. These two indirect e¤ects work in opposite directions.
First, being more sophisticated allows the future self 1 to better read information from the asset price, which therefore makes her trading more aligned with price changes-i.e., buying low and selling high-and therefore bene…ts the investor at date 0. This positive indirect e¤ect is captured by the term Cov(Ṽ p; D i ). When both the common noiseũ in investors'date-1 personalized signalss p;i and the residual uncertainty~ in the asset payo¤ are su¢ ciently small, we can compute Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) as follows:
In (25) , Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) is proportional to the di¤erence between investor i's sophistication level i and the market's average sophistication level . Intuitively, when i > , investor i's forecast beats the market, and so her trading improves her ex-ante welfare.
Second, investors engage in speculative trading in the date-1 …nancial market, because there is no risk sharing bene…ts in our setting. In this sense, trading is excessive, and the more an investor's future self trades, the harmful it is from self 0's perspective. Improving the attention level i allows self 1 to lower her perceived risk and thus she will trade more aggressively, which in turn harms self 0 via the excessive trading channel. This negative e¤ect is captured by the term V ar (D i ) in equation (24), which measures the size of self 1's trading in the …nancial market. Again, when bothũ and~ are small, we can compute
which is increasing in i .
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Panels a1-a3 of Figure 3 Note that among the three e¤ects of i on W i ; in (24) (i.e., Cov(Ṽ p; D i ), V ar (D i ), and C i ), only the e¤ect associated with Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) is positive. Thus, any nonzero values of i is driven by investors' incentive to beat the market in reading prices. However, in equilibrium, no investor beats the market since i = (For instance, (25)). This implies that the bene…t associated with Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) is zero in equilibrium. In this sense, private incentives to improve sophistication are misaligned with social welfare. Nonetheless, sophistication acquisition can still be socially bene…cial by curbing the welfare loss due to speculative trading, a point that we shall revisit shortly in Section 5.4.
The …rst-order condition of investor i's sophistication determination problem is: 8 > < > :
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have i = . Let ( ) @W ( ; ) @ i :
Then, the equilibrium sophistication level is determined by the following conditions:
(1) If (0) 0 and @ 2 W ( i ;0) @ 2 i 0, then = 0 is an equilibrium sophistication level;
(2) If for some > 0, = 0 and @ 2 W ( i ; ) @ 2 i 0, then this value of is an equilibrium sophistication level.
In Panel b1 of Figure 3 , we continue the numerical example in Panels a1-a3 and plot ( ) against . In this example, the equilibrium sophistication level is = 187:54.
Proposition 4 (Overall equilibrium) Suppose that u and are su¢ ciently large and that C ( ) is smooth, increasing, and weakly convex. There exists a unique symmetric overall equilibrium. If (0) 0, then = 0, and otherwise, is uniquely determined by = 0. The …nancial market equilibrium is given by Proposition 1 accordingly at the equilibrium sophistication level .
Complementarity, Multiplicity, and Market Fragility
Proposition 4 provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric overall equilibrium. Nonetheless, our economy admits multiple equilibria. Formally, if ( ) is downward sloping, then the equilibrium is unique. In contrast, when ( ) has an upward sloping segment, multiplicity can arise. It is the complementarity result on price informativeness in Part (a) of Proposition 2 that leads to the possibility of multiplicity.
Intuitively, the root reason that investors acquire sophistication is to better read information from prices and trade on this information. Thus, when the best price signals p is more accurate in predicting the fundamental, the bene…t from this more informed trading is higher. Recall that, by Part (a) of Proposition 2, as all investors become more sophisticated at date 1, the price conveys more precise information about the fundamental. As a result, each individual's incentive to acquire sophistication can become stronger, leading to complementarity in sophistication acquisition. This complementarity force can be so strong that ( ) can be upward sloping at some region, which admits multiple equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Multiplicity) Function ( ) can be upward sloping at some region, so that there can be multiple overall equilibria.
We prove Proposition 5 using a constructive example in Panel b2 of Figure 3 . The parameter values in Panel b2 are identical to those in Panel b1, except that " = 0:001 and k = 5 10 5 . We …nd that in Panel b2 of Figure 3 , ( ) is hump-shaped, and it crosses zero twice. As a result, there exist three equilibrium levels of : f0; 14:01; 81:72g. Among these three equilibria, the middle one is unstable (i.e., ( ) crosses zero from below), while the other two equilibria are stable.
This multiplicity result provides a source of market fragility in the sense that a small change in the market environment can cause a signi…cant change in equilibrium outcomes.
To illustrate this point, we use Panel c of Figure 3 to examine the implications of changing the sophistication cost in interpreting market data. Speci…cally, we continue to use the parameter values in Panel b2 of Figure 3 , but now we allow the cost parameter k to continuously change and plot the equilibrium values of against k. When there are multiple equilibria, we use dashed segments to indicate the unstable equilibrium. We see that in Panel c of Figure 3 , as k decreases, increases as long as investors coordinate on a particular stable equilibrium (say, the one with a larger value of ). This is intuitive: as the cost k of acquiring sophistication becomes lower, investors will choose to become more sophisticated and devote more e¤ort to study the price data.
The multiplicity suggests that a slight change in k can lead to jumps in . For instance, suppose that investors coordinate on a stable equilibrium with a higher value of . Then, when k is close to 8:5 10 5 , and when it drops slightly, the equilibrium value of can jump from 0 to 35:91. This implies that small changes in mental costs can cause individuals to dramatically adjust their sophistication levels. Alternatively, under the institutional interpretation of our setting, the sophistication acquisition cost corresponds to the training cost of trading desks. In this case, a small decrease in training costs can lead to a wave of intensively studying market data, such as development of algorithmic trading in …nancial markets.
Sophistication Cost and Investor Welfare
We measure investor welfare from an ex-ante perspective. That is, we de…ne welfare by self 0's equilibrium payo¤, W ( i ; ). The following proposition characterizes the investor welfare in a symmetric overall equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Welfare) In a symmetric overall equilibrium with sophistication level , we have Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) = 0, and thus the investor welfare is given by
As we discussed before, in a symmetric equilibrium, we have i = for i 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the term Cov(Ṽ p; D i ) vanishes in the de…nition of W ( i ; ) in (24) . This is a form of fallacy of composition: each investor tries to acquire sophistication and beat the market, but no one achieves it in equilibrium.
As a result, trading only has a negative e¤ect on equilibrium investor welfare, which is captured by the term V ar(Ṽ p) V ar (D i ) in equation (27) . Intuitively, in our setting, investors trade for speculation purposes, and their speculative positions are proportional to the di¤erence between their forecast of the fundamental and the asset price. After aggregation, the price averages out the idiosyncratic errors in investors'private information and as a result, investors end up holding positions related only to the noises in their information, leading to a "winner's curse" (see Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2010)). Variable V ar (D i ) measures the size of speculative trading; the more investors speculate, the more they lose.
Variable V ar(Ṽ p) is the wealth loss per unit trading: a higher return variance V ar(Ṽ p) means that it is more likely for the fundamentalṼ to deviate from the prevailing pricep, and thus the winner's curse harms investors more. Taken together, V ar(Ṽ p) V ar (D i )
captures the welfare loss due to the winner's curse. 6 The equilibrium value of investor sophistication a¤ects investor welfare W ;
in three ways (which respectively correspond to the three terms, C , V ar (D i ), and V ar(Ṽ p), in equation (27)). First, a higher will incur a higher cost C , which directly harms investor welfare. Second, a¤ects welfare through a¤ecting trading size V ar (D i ). By the de…nition of V olume in equation (19), we have V olume =
Thus, Part (c) of Proposition 3 indicates that a¤ects W ; via its e¤ect on V olume.
Note that two similar e¤ects are also present when we discuss how individual sophistication Due to the interactions among the three e¤ects of on W ; , in general there is a non-monotone relation between investor sophistication and investor welfare. Figure   4 illustrates this point for the parameter con…guration of Panel b1 of Figure 3 . We now allow the sophistication cost parameter k to continuously change and plot , W ; , V ar(Ṽ p); V ar (D i ), and C against k. As illustrated by Panel b1 of Figure 3 , the parameter con…guration guarantees unique overall equilibrium, so that we do not need to choose a particular equilibrium when conducting comparative statics. But we note that our results are quite robust to parameter con…gurations.
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of portfolio risk that is driven by speculation based on heterogeneous beliefs. Speculative variance tends to harm welfare and it is greater when the assets feature greater belief disagreement, both features consistent with our model. 7 Note that the trading-size e¤ects are not identical. Speci…cally, in Section 5.2, we take as given and vary i , while here, the comparative statics requires i = . For instance, in equation (26) , V ar (D i ) is always increasing in i for a …xed , but once we set i = , V ar (D i ) is decreasing in for su¢ ciently large values of .
In Panel a of Figure 4 , the equilibrium value of sophistication decreases with the cost k of acquiring sophistication, which is intuitive. In Panel b, the equilibrium investor welfare W
; …rst decreases and then increases with k. This is due to the interactions among the three forces. First, in Panel c1, return variance V ar(Ṽ p) increases with k, as a result of the decreasing in Panel a. In e¤ect, the combination of Panels a and c1 of Figure 4 is a re ‡ection of the observation that (Ṽ p) decreases in in the lower middle panel of 
Two Types of Investors
We now consider a variation of the baseline model and show that our main results are robust. Financial market equilibrium at date 1 The price function in the date-1 …nancial market is still given by equation (10) . The CARA-normal setting implies that a sophisticated investor's demand for the risky asset is
where by Bayes'rule, we have we can compute the implied price function, which is in turn compared with the conjectured price function, yielding the following …fth-order polynomial of that determines the …nancial market equilibrium:
where A 5 = e " ( v + + " ) ; A 4 = 2 e " ( v + + " ) ; A 3 = " ( e u + e v + u v + e + e " + u + u " ) ;
It is clear that there always exists a solution to F ( ; ) = 0, and hence existence is established. After we compute , the price coe¢ cients are as follows: 
:
Sophistication level equilibrium at date 0 At date 0, self 0 of each investor considers whether to spend cost c to achieve full sophistication in the future …nancial market. Again, self 0 is fully rational in making this decision, and we can view c as a commitment cost to ensure that the future self completely removes bounded rationality. Consider a representative investor i. Suppose that she rationally expects that a fraction of investors will choose to achieve full sophistication. Let W S ( ) and W U ( ) respectively denote the ex-ante expected utilities of a sophisticated self 1 and an unsophisticated self 1. We need to compare W S ( ) and W U ( ) to determine investor i's choice of sophistication at date 0.
Direct computation shows
Thus, the net bene…t of becoming sophisticated is
In this setup, the fraction of sophisticated investors serves the same role as the sophistication level in the baseline model. Function ( ) corresponds to function ( ) in Section 5. The equilibrium fraction is de…ned by the following three conditions:
(a) If (0) 0, then = 0 is an equilibrium fraction of sophisticated investors;
(b) If (1) 0, then = 1 is an equilibrium fraction of sophisticated investors; and (c) If ( ) = 0 for some 2 (0; 1), then constitutes an interior equilibrium fraction of sophisticated investors.
Results We now show that our main qualitative results continue to hold in this variant model. In Panels a1-a4 of Figure 5 , we plot price informativeness measure , return volatility Figure 5 , we plot the bene…t of acquiring sophistication, ( ). This corresponds to Panels b1-b2 of Figure 3 . In Panels c1 and c2 of Figure 5 , we plot the equilibrium fraction of sophisticated investors and the equilibrium investor welfare W against the cost c of acquiring sophistication, which respectively correspond to Panels a and b of Figure 4 . In Panels a1-a4 and Panels c1-c2 of Figure 5 , we set v = = " = = 1 and e = u = 1000. In Panels b1 and b2 of Figure   5 , we v = = = 1; e = u = 1000; and c = 5 10 3 .
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We make the following observations that con…rm the main results in our baseline model.
First, in Panels a1-a4 of Figure 5 , compared to the standard REE (with = 1), costly price interpretation injects noise into the price (i.e., > 0 for < 1), generates excess return volatility and trading volume (i.e., (Ṽ p) > 
Conclusion
We develop a model to capture the notion that investors cannot costlessly process price data in …nancial markets. Although investors actively infer information from the price, their information processing is noisy. The more sophisticated are investors, the smaller is this processing noise. After reading price data and form their beliefs, investors hold optimal trading positions according to their own beliefs (and so they are only boundedly rational in extracting information from the price). We …nd that imperfect price interpretation can inject noise into the price system, which serves as a form of endogenous noise trading in our setting. Compared to the standard REE, our model generates price momentum, excessive return volatility, and excessive trading volume. As investor sophistication increases, return volatility decreases, while disagreement and volume can exhibit a hump shape.
We employ a learning technology to endogenize investors'sophistication levels that in turn determine their bounded rationality at the trading stage. From an individual's perspective, the bene…t of sophistication acquisition is to beat the market by reading better information from prices. However, in equilibrium, this forms a fallacy of composition, because all investors end up with the same equilibrium level of sophistication. The social bene…t of sophistication acquisition lies in the fact that more sophisticated traders bring the price closer to the fundamental, which therefore lowers the welfare loss due to speculative trading. In general, there is a non-monotone relation between equilibrium sophistication and equilibrium investor welfare. Finally, there can exist strategic complementarity in sophistication acquisition, leading to the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Appendix A: Lemmas Lemma 1 Given ( e ; u ; " ) 2 R 3 ++ and let ! 1. We have: Proof. (a) By the proof for Proposition 1, we know that is determined by f ( ) = 0, where f ( ) crosses 0 from below. As " increases, f ( ) shifts upward. Since f crosses zero from below, we know that decreases with " . So, is bounded as " goes to 0. By (16), we know that as " ! 0, to ( u " ) e u = 0, which implies ! e " . Inserting ! e " into p = e u+( e+ u) u+ e( +1) 2 + 2 , we have p ! e + . Using the expressions of a v and a u in Proposition 1, we have a v ! "+ e+ v + "+ e+ and a u ! e( e+ "+ ) "( e+ v + "+ ) . Using equation (13) and ! e " , we can show p;i ! e + i . Using ! e " , p;i ! e + i , and the expressions of 's in the proof of Proposition 1, we have the limits of 's in the lemma.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 We can compute the discriminant of the cubic f ( ) as follows: 
which is negative. Thus, there exists a unique real root, which establishes the uniqueness of a …nancial market equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Corollary 1
By Lemma 1, we have p = e u + e + u u + e ( + 1) 2 + 2 / :
By the expressions of a v and a u in Proposition 1, we have
QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (a) Price informativeness By the proof for Proposition 1, we know that is determined by f ( ) = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, we can compute: @ @ = To prove part (b2), we …rst use (A4) to compute @ log Disagreement @ "
and then combine with Lemma 2. Speci…cally:
As " ! 0, we have @ log Disagreement @ / 2 + 3 u v + v
As " ! 1, we have @ log Disagreement @ / 1 2 " < 0: To prove part (c2), we …rst use (A5) to compute @ log V olume @ "
As " ! 0, we have @ log V olume @
As " ! 1, we have @ log V olume @ / 1 2 " < 0:
Proof of Proposition 4
Using demand function (7) and the expression of investor i's date-0 payo¤ function in equation (24), we can compute: 
Denote the right-hand side of the above equation by W 1 i ;
. When C i is smooth, increasing, and weakly convex, W 1 i ; is smooth and strictly concave in i . Thus, for any given , there exists a unique i that maximizes W 1 i ; .
Direct computations show
( ) @W 1 ( ; )
Given that C i is weakly convex, we know that ( ) is strictly decreasing in and that lim !1 ( ) < 0. Thus, if (0) 0, then = 0 is the unique equilibrium sophistication level. If (0) > 0, then there exists a unique 2 (0; 1) satisfying = 0, which determines the unique equilibrium sophistication level. QED.
Proof of Proposition 6
When i is identical across investors, we have E(Ṽ js i ;s p;i ;z i ) p = s;i" i + p;i + z;i ẽ i + z;i~ i ) The dashed lines plot the values in a standard REE economy (i.e., = ∞).
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Figure 3: Sophistication Level Equilibrium
Investors' cost function of acquiring sophistication is ( ) = . In all panels, we set = = = 1 and = = 1000. Panels a1 -a3 respectively plot ( ; ), 
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Figure 4: Sophistication Cost and Investor Welfare
Investors' cost function of acquiring sophistication is ( ) = . Panels a and b plot the implications of changing sophistication cost parameters on the equilibrium values of sophistication * and welfare * , respectively. Panels c1 -c3 respectively plot the three terms affecting the equilibrium welfare. The other parameter values are: = = = = 1 and = = 1000.
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Figure 5: The Economy with Two Types of Investors
Panels a1 -a4 plot price informativeness (negatively measured by α), return volatility, price momentum, and trading volume against the fraction µ of sophisticated investors. The dashed lines plot the values in a standard REE economy (i.e., µ =1). Panels b1 and b2 plot the net benefit of sophistication acquisition. Panels c1 and c2 plot the equilibrium mass µ* and welfare W* against the cost c of sophistication acquisition. In Panels a1 -a4 and Panels c1 and c2, we set = = = = 1 and = = 1000. In Panels b1
and b2, we set = = = 1, = = 1000, and = 5 × 10 −3 .
